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Abstract
The equilibrium prices in asset markets, as stated by Keynes (1930): “...will
be …xed at the point at which the sales of the bears and the purchases of the bulls
are balanced.” We propose a descriptive theory of …nance explicating Keynes’
claim that the prices of assets today equilibrate the optimism and pessimism of
bulls and bears regarding the payo¤s of assets tomorrow.
This equilibration of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs of investors is a consequence of investors maximizing a¤ective utilities subject to budget constraints
de…ned by market prices and investor’s income. The set of a¤ective utilities is a
new class of non-expected utility functions representing the attitudes of investors
for optimism or pessimism, de…ned as the composition of the investor’s attutudes
for risk and her attitudes for ambiguity. Bulls and bears are de…ned respectively
as optimistic and pessimistic investors. .
JEL Classi…cation: D81, G02, G11
Keywords: Risk, Ambiguity, Irrational Exhuberance
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Introduction

Subjective expected utility theory, originally proposed by Savage as the foundation
of Bayesian statistics, is a theory of decision-making under uncertainty that “... does
not leave room for optimism or pessimism to play any role in the person’s judgment”
(Savage, 1954, p. 68). This perspective is inconsistent with the view of Keynes who
thought of the market price as a balance of the sales of bears, the pessimists, and
the purchases of bulls, the optimists. That is, “equilibrium prices in asset markets
will be …xed at the point at which the sales of the bears and the purchases of the
bulls are balanced” (Keynes, 1930). In Keynes, the equilibrium in asset markets
is an a¤ective notion. That is,the optimism and pessimism of investors not the
risk and return of di¤erent asset classes determine the equilibrium asset prices. In
addition to economists, there are also psychologists who acknowledge the presence
Research Department, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 600 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, MA
02210, USA.
y
Department of Economics, Yale University, Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520-8268, USA.
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of optimistic bias: [2002 Nobel Laureate ] Kahneman “Most of us view the world as
more benign than it really is.... We also tend to exaggerate our ability to forecast
the future. In terms of its consequences for decisions, the optimistic bias may well be
the most signi…cant cognitive bias.”Cognitive biases, such as the optimistic bias, are
thought by some economists and psychologists to be inconsistent with the economists’
conception of rational choice.
In this paper, we propose a rational theory of optimistic (pessimistic) bias in asset
markets. That is, the behavior of bulls and bears is rational in the standard economic
sense of agents maximizing (non-expected) utility subject to a budget constraint,
de…ned by asset prices and the agent’s income. This new class of non-expected
utilities, de…ned as a¤ective utilities in this paper, are utility representations of the
investor’s attitudes for optimism. A¤ective utility is an empirically tractable and
descriptive representation of an investor’s attitudes in …nancial markets, if she is
either a bull or a bear. Simply put, bulls are optimists who believe that tomorrow
asset prices will go up, while bears are pessimists who believe that tomorrow asset
prices will go down.
A¤ective utilities are de…ned as the composition of the utility representation of investor’s attitudes for risk and the utility representation of her attitudes for ambiguity,
where attitudes for risk and attitudes for ambiguity are assumed to be independent.
If U (x) represents the investor’s utility attitudes for risk, where x hx1 ; x2 ; :::; xN i
is a limited liability state-contingent claim, then U (x) hu(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )i is
the corresponding state-utility vector for x, where u(xj ) is the utility of the payo¤
xj , if state j occurs. If J(y) represents her utility attitudes for ambiguity, where y is
the state-utility vector U (x), then
U :X

N
R++
!Y

N
R++

and
J :Y

N
R++
!R

x !J

U (x)

is the composition of U and J, where J U (x) represents the investor’s utility attitudes
for optimism(pessimism)
We follow the asset pricing literature where an investor is said to be risk-averse
if her utility of wealth u(w) is a concave, monotone function of wealth w and riskseeking if her utility of wealth u(w) is a convex, monotone function of wealth w. To
represent attitudes for ambiguity, we follow the decision- theoretic literature,where a
decision-maker is said to be ambiguity-averse if J(U (x)) is a concave function of stateutility vectors U (x) — for details, see Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., Rustichini, A.,
(2006) — and a decision-maker is said to be ambiguity-seeking if J(U (x)) is a convex
function of state-utility vectors U (x) – for details, see Bracha and Brown (2012).
We de…ne bulls as investors endowed with a¤ective utilities J U (x) convex in x and
bears as investors endowed with a¤ective utilities J U (x) concave in x: We show
in the next section that these speci…cations are equivalent to investors being bulls if
and only if they have optimistic beliefs about the future payo¤s of state-contingent
2

claims and investors are bears if and only if they have pessimistic beliefs about the
future payo¤s of state-contingent claims.
Table 1 below summarizes the four types of a¤ective utilities, where the cells are
investors’attitudes for optimism and pessimism. An investor who is both risk -averse
and ambiguity- averse is a bear, i.e., a pessimist. Similarly, an investor who is both
risk- seeking and ambiguity- seeking is a bull, i.e., an optimist. These cases, the
diagonal cells of the table, are the symmetric a¤ective utilities and the o¤-diagonal
cells of the table are the asymmetric a¤ective utilities.
Table 1: A¤ective Utilities
Utilities
Risk-averse Risk-seeking
Ambiguity-averse
Bears
Asymmetric
Ambiguity-seeking Asymmetric
Bulls
Economists are willing to believe that investors endowed with the composition
of ambiguity -averse utilities and risk -averse utilities are bears and that investors
endowed with the composition of ambiguity-seeking utilities and risk -seeking utilities
are bulls, where we assume that both U and J are monotone. Their intuition follows
from the convexity or concavity of the composition of monotone convex or concave
functions, see section 3.2 in Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004). They may be surprised
that for asymmetric quadratic a¤ective utilities, given a scalar proxy for risk, and a
scalar proxy for ambiguity, that there exists a state-contingent claim x
b, “the reference
point,” where for quadratic utilities of ambiguity and risk, J U (x) is concave or
pessimistic on
N
[b
x; +1] fx 2 R+
:x x
bg

and J

U (x) is convex or optimistic on
(0; x
b]

N
fx 2 R+
:x

x
bg

That is, an investor with quadratic utilities of ambiguity and quadratic utilities
of risk is a bull for “losses,” and a bear for “gains,” reminiscent of the shape and
rationale of risk preferences in prospect theory — see Kahneman (2011).
To prove Keynes’claim that the prices of assets today equilibrate the optimism
and pessimism of bulls and bears regarding the payo¤s of assets tomorrow, we consider the existence and optimality of competitive equilibria in a two period, limited
liability, state-contingent claim model of exchange, with a …nite number of states and
a continuum of bulls and bears. It follows from Aumann’s (1969) existence and (1966)
core equivalence theorems that equilibria exist and the third welfare theorem holds,
i.e., every core allocation can be supported as a competitive allocation. In the …nal
section of the paper, the equilibration of the optimism of bulls and the pessimism
of bears, as claimed by Keynes, is discussed in the context of the patterns of trade
between bulls and bears at the equilibrium prices.
In the next section we present formal de…nitions of attitudes for risk and ambiguity. We illustrate these notions with quadratic utility representations of attitudes
for risk and ambiguity.
3
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Notions of Risk, Ambiguity and Optimism

First, a few words about the notions of risk and ambiguity as they are used in
this paper. For von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) risk means we know the
probabilities of tomorrow’s state of the world. Risk-seeking investors prefer risky
lotteries to certain lotteries with payo¤s equal to the expected values of the risky
lotteries. Risk-averse agents prefer lotteries with certain payo¤s to lotteries where
the expected values are equal to the certain payo¤s. Ellsberg (1961) introduced
the notion of ambiguity as the alternative notion to risk, when we are ignorant of
the probability of states of the world tomorrow. In Ellsberg’s celebrated two-color
paradox, subjects who choose the ambiguous urn in both trials are ambiguity-seeking
and subjects who choose the risky urn in both trials are ambiguity-averse.
If the a¤ective utility function is a strictly, convex (concave) smooth function of
limited liability state-contingent claims x then the investor is optimistic (pessimistic).
The value of the gradient of the a¤ective utility function at x is the investor’s perceived unnormalized probability distribution for x. That is, the investor’s perceived
odds that state k will occur tomorrow with payo¤ xk . It follows from the envelope theorem applied to the Legendre–Fenchel biconjugate representation of strictly, convex
(concave) smooth functions, that the gradient of the investor’s utility function with
respect to x is a strictly monotone increasing (decreasing) map. In fact, these conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient for J U (x) to be strictly, convex (concave).
This formal de…nition of optimism or pessimism with respect to state-contingent
claims depends on both the investor’s attitudes for risk and her attitudes for ambiguity. This is an immediate consequence of the chain rule in computing the gradient of
the composite a¤ective utility function. For bulls, the Legendre–Fenchel biconjugate
N is the e¤ective domain of J U (x),
of J U (x) is denoted [J U (x)] , where R++
[J U (x)] ; [J( )] and [J( )]
i
hX
[J U (x)]
max
x [J( )]
N
2R++

where [J( )] , the Legendre -Fenchel conjugate of J U (x) is a smooth, strictly convex
N and
function on R++
hX
i
[J( )]
max
x J U (x)
N
x2R++

For bears,
[J

U (x)]

min

N
2R++

the Legendre–Fenchel conjugate of J
N , and
cave function on R++
[J( )]

min

hX

x

[J( )]

i

U (x), where [J( )] is a smooth, strictly con-

N
x2R++

hX
4

x

J

i
U (x)

Hence by the envelope theorem, if
hX
[J U (x)] = max
N
2R++

x

[J( )]

then
rx [J

U (x)]

and if
[J

U (x)]

= min

N
2R++

= arg max

N
2R++

hX

x

rx [J

U (x)]

hX

[J( )]

then
= arg min

N
2R++

i

hX

hX

=

x
i

=

[J( )]
hX

x

It follows from the biconjugate theorem that
[J

U (x)]

J

b x

i

b x

[J( )]

i

[J(b)]

=b
[J(b)]

i

i

:

=b

U (x)

Hence the beliefs of bulls are monotone increasing maps of asset payo¤s and the
beliefs of bears are monotone decreasing maps of asset payo¤s. See our working
paper, CFDP 1898 for additional details.
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Quadratic Utilities for Risk and Ambiguity

In working paper CFDP 1898 we examine the relationship between attitudes for
optimism (pessimism), risk and ambiguity for additively-separable a¤ective utilities,
where in that paper, a¤ective utilities are called Keynesian utilities. This family
of examples is intended to illustrate the concepts – see CFDP 1898 for additional
details. These examples do suggest the richer class of quadratic representations of
investor’s attitudes for risk, and ambiguity that allow econometric estimation of two
scalar proxies for optimistic (pessimistic) bias in asset markets, denoted respectively
as and .
In this section we analyze the case of quadratic utilities and present conditions on
and , such that the investor is optimistic or pessimistic. Here we show that for a
class of asymmetric a¤ective utilities where the investor is risk averse and ambiguity
seeking or risk seeking and ambiguity averse, that the space of state-contingent claims
can be partitioned into quadrants, relative to some reference state-contingent claim,
where the the investor’s a¤ective utility function is convex in the …rst quadrant and
concave in the third quadrant or concave in the …rst quadrant ad convex in the third
quadrant –see CFDP 1898 for additional details.
De…nition 1 Quadratic utilities for risk:U (x) (u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone,
N onto RN ,with
smooth, strictly concave (convex), diagonal quadratic map from R++
++
the proxy for risk. That is, U (x) is an N N diagonal matrix, where for k =
2
<0
1; 2; :::; N : Uk;k (x) = u(xk )
0 + 1 xk + 2 xk . u(xk ) is strictly concave i¤
and u(xk ) is strictly convex i¤ > 0
5

De…nition 2 If 2 R, then diag( ) 2 RN N is a symmetric diagonal matrix with
eigenvalues equal to . Quadratic utilities for ambiguity: J(y) is a monotone, smooth,
N into R;with
strictly concave (convex) quadratic function from R+
the proxy for
1
N . J(y)
ambiguity. That is, J(y) = 2 ydiag( )y + 1 y + 0 , where 0 2 R, 1 2 R++
is strictly concave i¤ < 0 and J(y) is strictly convex i¤ > 0:
Theorem 3 If J U (x) is the composition of quadratic utilities for risk and quadratic
utilities for ambiguity,where
diag( )
then rK
x J

U (x)

diag[r2x U (x)] and diag( )
0 for K

diag[r2U (x) J(U (x))]

5:

Proof. If
rx J

U (x) = [rx U (x)] [rU (x) J(U (x))]:

the Hadamard or pointwise product of [rx U (x)] and [rU (x) J(U (x))], then by application of the chain rule for Hadamard products proposed by Bentler and Lee (1978)
and proved by Magnus and Neudecker (1985) — see CFDP 1898 for details, we obtain:
r2x J

U (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]
r3x J

U (x) = 3diag( )diag( )diag[rx U (x)]
r4x J

U (x) = 3[diag( )]2 [diag( )]

rK
x J

U (x) = 0 for K

5:

In Theorems 2 and 3, we characterize asymmetric a¤ective utilities, where we
N into the standard four
prove the existence of a reference point x
b that partitions R+
quadrants, with the reference point x
b as the origin. J U (x) is concave in quadrant
N :x
I;where quadrant I fx 2 R+
x
bg and convex in quadrant III, where quadrant
N
III
fx 2 R+ : x x
bg The Hessian of J U (x) is inde…nite in quadrants II and
N =f(b
x; +1] [ (0; x
b]g. J U (x) is optimistic
IV . That is, r2x J U (x) is inde…nite on R+
for “losses,” i.e., x x
b and pessimistic for “gains,” i.e., x x
b, analogous with the
shape of the utility of risk in prospect theory — see …gure 10 in Khaneman (2011).
In Theorems 4 and 5, we characterize symmetric a¤ective utilities or optimistic and
pessimistic investors.
Theorem 4 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x) (u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth,strictly concave, diagonal
N onto RN ,with the proxy for risk,
quadratic map from R++
< 0; (b) J(y) is a
++
N into R;with the proxy for
monotone, smooth,strictly convex quadratic map from R+
ambiguity, > 0, (c)
r2x J

b (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U
b (x)])2
U

b (x))] : Chain Rule
diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U

then there exists a reference point x
b such that the …nancial market data D is rationalized by the composite function J U (x) with two domains of convexity: (b
x; +1]
and (0; x
b];where J U (x) is concave on (b
x; +1] and J U (x) is convex on (0; x
b]
6

Proof.
r2x U (x) =

diag( ) where

< 0: Risk Averse

r2U (x) J(U (x)) = diag( ) where
r2x J

U (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2
lim

1

diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]: Chain Rule
1

diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]

kxk1 !1

diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]

> 0: Ambiguity-Seeking

diag[rx U (x)]2

diag[rx U (x)]2

lim diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]diag[rx U (x)]
1

diag[rx U (x)]2

diag[rx U (b
x)]2

2

x!0

diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]

1

diag[rU (x) J(U (b
x))]

=0

1

1

diag[ ]: Bears

=0
2

diag[rU (x) J(U (b
x))]diag[rx U (b
x)]

diag[ ]: Bulls

Theorem 5 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x) (u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth, convex, diagonal quadratic
N onto RN with the proxy for risk,
> 0, (b) J(y) is a monotone,
map from R++
++
N into R with the proxy for ambiguity,
smooth, concave quadratic map from R+
< 0, (c)
r2x J

b (x) =
U

b (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U
b (x))]: Chain Rule
diag( )(diag[rx U

then there exists a reference point x
b such that the …nancial market data D is rationalized by the composite function J(U (x)) with two domains of convexity: (b
x; +1]
and (0; x
b], where J U (x) is concave on (b
x; +1] and J U (x) is convex on (0; x
b]:
Proof.

r2x U (x) = diag( ) where

r2x J

r2Ub (x) J(U (x)) =

b (x) =
U

> 0: Risk-Seeking

diag( ) where

< 0: Ambiguity-Averse

b (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U
b (x))]: Chain Rule
diag( )(diag[rx U
lim

kxk1 !1

b (x))]diag[rx U
b (x)]
diag[rU (x) J(U

b (x))]diag[rx U
b (x)]
diagrU (x) J(U
lim

kxk!0

2

2

1

=0

b (b
b (b
diag[rU (x) J(U
x))]diag[rx U
x)]

b (x))]
diag[rU (x) J(U

b (x))]diag[rx U
b (x)]
diag[rU (x) J(U

2

1

b (x)]2
diag[rx U

1

diag[ ]: Bears

=0

b (b
b (b
diag[rU (x) J(U
x))]diag[rx U
x)]

7

2

2

diag[ ]: Bulls:

Theorem 6 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x)
(u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth, concave, diagonal
N onto RN ,with the proxy for risk,
quadratic map from R++
< 0 (b) J(y) is a
++
N
monotone, smooth,concave quadratic function from R++ into R, with the proxy for
ambiguity,
< 0 (c)
r2x J
then J

b (x) =
U

b (x)])2
diag( )(diag[rx U

b (x))]: Chain Rule
diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U

N
U (x) is concave on R++

Proof.
r2x U (x) =

r2Ub (x) J(U (x)) =

Bears: r2x J

U (x) =

diag( ) where

< 0: Risk-Averse

diag( ) where

< 0: Ambiguity-Averse

diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2

diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))] < 0:

Theorem 7 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x) (u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth, convex, diagonal quadratic
N onto RN ,with the proxy for risk,
map from R++
> 0; (b) J(y) is a monotone,
++
N into R, with the proxy for ambiguity,
smooth, convex quadratic function from R++
> 0, (c)
r2x J
then J

b (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U
b (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U
b (x))]: Chain Rule
U
N :
U (x) is convex on R++

Proof.
r2x U (x) = diag( ) where

r2Ub (x) J(U (x)) = diag( ) where

Bulls: r2x J

4

> 0: Risk-Seeking
> 0: Ambiguity-Seeking

U (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))] > 0:

Patterns of Trade between Bulls and Bears

Recall the Keynesian aphorism: “The equilibrium prices in asset markets will be
…xed at the point at which the sales of the bears and the purchases of the bulls
are balanced.” In this …nal section, we explicate Keynes’ claim that the prices of
assets today equilibrate the optimism and pessimism of bulls and bears regarding
the payo¤s of assets tomorrow. We assume, that the consumption sets of investors
are convex, open subsets of RN containing the positive orthant and that investors
maximize smooth, monotone concave or smooth, monotone convex a¤ective utility
8

function subject to a budget constraint. The budget constraint is de…ned by market
prices and the investor’s income.
Bears maximize a smooth, monotone, concave (pessimistic) a¤ective utility function; deriving the asset demand of bears is therefore a standard application of the
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) Theorem, where in our case the Slater constraint quali…cation is trivially satis…ed (see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004). For this reason, the
…rst order conditions for a saddle-point of the Lagrangian are necessary and su¢ cient
for optimality. For bears, the utility maximizing optimum may be in the interior of
the positive orthant. where the expected odds today, by bears, of tomorrow’s market
prices are equal to the odds determined by today’s market prices.
Bulls maximize a monotone, convex (optimistic) a¤ective utility function subject
to a budget constraint. This is quite a di¤erent problem: the optimum in this case
is achieved at an extreme point of the budget set — for details, see chapter 32 in
Rockafellar (1970). If there are only two states of the world, where the market prices
are (1,1) and the investor’s income is 1, then the extreme points of the budget set
are (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0). For a monotone convex utility function, the optimum is
achieved at (0,1) or (1,0), the corners of the budget line. More generally, the utility
maximizing optimum for bulls is always on the boundary of the positive orthant, i.e.,
bulls speculate on the most optimistic outcomes.
We consider a two period investment model with two states of the world, where
x = (x1 ; x2 ) is a state-contingent claim and today’s state prices are (p1 ; p2 ). If
the investor’s income today is I and she is endowed with a convex a¤ective utility
function, UBulls (x), then her optimal investment problem is (P ):
maxfUBulls (x) j

x1

0;

x2

0; p x

I

0g

where the Fritz John Lagrangian for constrained maximization
L(x1 ; x2 ;

0;

1;

2;

3)

0 UBulls (x)

1[

x1 ]

2[

x2 ]

3 [p

x

I]:

Theorem 8 [Fritz John ]: If x is a local maximizer of (P ) then there exists multipliers
( 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) 0 such that:
0 (@x1 UBulls (x

); @x2 UBulls (x )) = (

1

+

3 p1 ;

2

+

3 p2 );

where 0 = 1, by Theorems 19:12 in Simon and Blume (1994) (a)If x = (0; x2 );then
2 = 0:Hence
(@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 )); @x2 UBulls ((0; x2 )) = (

1

+

3 p1 ;

3 p2 )

It follows that some bulls are more optimistic than the market that tomorrow’s state
of the world is state 2. That is,
@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
=
@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
(b)If x = (x1 ; 0), then

1

p2
3 p2
>
+
p
1
3 1 p1

= 0:Hence

(@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0)); @x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0)) = (
9

3 p1 ;

2

+

3 p2 ):

It follows that other bulls are more optimistic than the market that tomorrow’s state
of the world is state 1. That is,
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
=
@x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))

3 p1
2

+

3 p2

>

p1
:
p2

If the investor’s income today is I and she is endowed with concave a¤ective
utilities UBears (x), then her optimal investment problem is (P ) :
maxfUBears (x) j

x1

0;

x2

0; p x

I

0g

3 [p

x

where the KKT Lagrangian for constrained maximization
L(x1 ; x2 ; )

UBears (x)

1[

x1 ]

2[

x2 ]

I]:

Theorem 9 [Karush-Kuhn-Tucker] If Slater’s constraint quali…cation is satis…ed then
N , i¤ there exists a multipliers
x is a maximizer of (P ), where x 2 R+
( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) 0 such that:
(@x1 UBears (x ); @x2 UBears (x )) = ( 3 p1
(a)If x = (0; x2 ); then

2

1 ; 3 p2

2 ):

= 0 and

(@x1 UBears ((0; x2 )); @x2 UBears ((0; x2 )) = ( 3 p1

1 ; 3 p2 ):

It follows that some bears are more pessimistic than the market that tomorrow’s state
of the world is state 1. That is,
@x1 UBears ((0; x2 ))
=
@x2 UBears ((0; x2 ))
(b)If x = (x1 ; 0);then

1

3 p1

1

<

3 p2

p1
p2

= 0 and

(@x1 UBears (x ); @x2 UBears (x )) = ( 3 p1

1 ; 3 p2 ):

It follows that other bears are more pessimistic than the market that tomorrow’s state
of the world is state 2. That is,
@x2 UBears ((x1 ; 0))
=
@x1 UBears ((x1 ; 0))

3 p2
3 p1

2

<

p2
:
p1

Theorem 10 (a) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), some bulls trade Arrow–Debreu statecontingent claims for state 2 with bears for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for
state 1:That is,
p2
@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
>
@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
p1
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@x2 UBears ((x1 ; 0))
:
@x1 UBears ((x1 ; 0))

(b) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), other bulls trade Arrow–Debreu state-contingent
claims for state 2 with other bulls for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for state
1. That is,
p2
@x UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
>
:
> 2
@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
p1
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
(c) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), some bulls trade Arrow-Debreu state-contingent
claims for state 1 with bears for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for state 2.
That is,
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p1
@x1 UBears ((0; x2 ))
>
:
@x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p2
@x2 UBears ((0; x2 ))
(d) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), other bulls trade Arrow-Debreu state-contingent
claims for state 1 with other bulls for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for state
2. That is,
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p1
@x UBulls ((0; x2 ))
>
> 1
:
@x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p2
@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
In our model, the fundamental di¤erence between bears and bulls is that bulls
always speculate, by purchasing only the Arrow–Debreu security that pays 1 if state
1 occurs or purchasing only the Arrow–Debreu security that pays 1 if state 2 occurs.
Bulls never diversify by purchasing a portfolio of the two Arrow-Debreu security,
suggesting to some economists that these investors are “irrationally exuberant.” In
contrast, bears may speculate or diversify, depending on the equilibrium prices and
the shape of their indi¤erence curves. That is, if indi¤erence curves don’t cut the
coordinate axes, say the indi¤erence curves of a Cobb–Douglas utility function, then
bears only diversify and never speculate. Examples of equilibrium for this special
case are presented in CFDP 1898.
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